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I. INTRODUCTION
Dissatisfaction with the governance of public companies is as old as the public
company itself, but public concern about corporate governance is spasmodic. When the
stock market booms, as in the 1990s, investors are merrily engrossed counting their
profits and don’t fret about governance. When stocks crash amid an epidemic of
corporate scandals, as in 2001, public fury erupts and demands change. To calm the
storm, Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the stock
exchanges make elaborate pretenses to effect bold solutions. With luck, stock prices
revive and investors relax until the next crash. By then, the old troupe of legislators and
regulators has been replaced by a new cast.
The crash and scandals of 2001 show that prior reforms did not cure the ills of
corporate governance, and there is little reason to think that the recent spate of reforms
will be any more effective. Despite a partial recovery of stock prices, many symptoms of
the underlying disease persist, including excessive executive compensation, empire
building by managements, and entrenchment of incumbents against unwanted takeovers.
Unfortunately, investors seem to have been mollified by the recent reforms, and even
these inadequate measures may be emasculated by the management lobby.
The fundamental problem of corporate governance remains what it has always been:
the separation of ownership and control. No reform can succeed unless it overcomes this
contradiction. Corporate executives are determined to preserve their privileges and a
number of scholars deny this claim; in effect, these Panglosses consider the status quo the
best of all possible worlds. Others recognize that corporate governance is broken and that
initiatives recently instituted or proposed are inadequate. Several have proposed changes,
some of which would be beneficial, but none promises to eliminate the separation of
ownership and control.
The stakes in the corporate governance conflict are high. The loss in equity values
from separation of ownership and control is hard to gauge but certainly amount to
trillions of dollars. 1 This waste discourages public ownership. Robert Monks estimates
that excessive executive compensation alone effectively imposes a 10% tax on
shareholders and that this cost is spurring investors to flee into private equity.2 The losses
borne by employees and customers are even harder to calculate. However, employment
and wages tend to grow faster and prices tend to be lower at more profitable firms, so the
costs of inefficient corporate governance to these other constituencies are certainly
substantial.
The problems of corporate governance should not be overstated:
Despite the alleged flaws in its governance system, the U.S. economy has
1. The loss in equity values from staggered boards alone has been estimated at $350 billion. See infra
note 44.
2. Symposium on Corporate Elections 17 (Lucian A. Bebchuck ed., Ctr. For Law, Econ. & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 448, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=471640 (comments of Robert Monks);
see also Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61 (claiming
that “[t]he publicly held corporation . . . has outlived its usefulness in many sectors of the economy because of
the central weakness of the public corporation—the conflict between owners and managers over the control and
use of corporate resources”).
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performed very well, both on an absolute basis and particularly relative to other
countries. U.S. productivity gains in the past decade have been exceptional, and
the U.S. stock market has consistently outperformed other world indices over
the last two decades, including the period since the scandals broke. In other
words, the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed system. If anything, it
suggests a system that is well above average. 3
Nonetheless, we should not be complacent. The threat to the American economy
from poor corporate governance is greater now than ever. Formerly, capital flows were
obstructed by national barriers, and only a few industrialized countries offered an
attractive investment climate. Financial markets are now global and many formerly
undeveloped third-world nations compete for capital. If American companies are
wasteful, investors will ship their money elsewhere, with dire consequences to
employment and economic growth in America.
Part II of this article describes the corporate governance debate. Part III explains
why the separation of ownership and control is the problem of corporate governance and
why past reforms have failed. Part IV discusses the reforms instituted and proposed after
the recent scandals and why they too will fail. Part V urges a means of finally solving the
problem of corporate governance.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The debate over corporate governance waxes and wanes counter to the fortunes of
the stock market. The bull market of the 1920s abruptly ended with the crash of 1929,
which ushered in the Great Depression. Congress adopted the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which forbade fraud and required broad disclosure
in securities trading and proxy solicitations by public companies. 4 Although these laws
influenced corporate governance, direct regulation was left to the states. Subsequent
market breaks triggered new federal laws, but the core of corporate law remained the
preserve of the states. Federal law did not, and was not designed to, end the separation of
ownership and control.
With general prosperity after 1945 investors lost interest in corporate governance.
The economic stagnation of the 1970s and early 1980s revived their concern. A loose
consensus emerged in support of the monitoring model of governance, which posited that
separation of ownership and control can be remedied by installing a board of independent
outside directors to choose the best managers, give them compensation with incentives to
perform well, prevent self-serving conduct by management, and replace managers who
do not pan out. 5 Although the monitoring model was largely precatory, not legally
mandated, it gradually exerted great influence. Most public companies now have boards

3. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and
What’s Wrong?, 15 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 8 (2003).
4. See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77zz-3); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a78nn).
5. See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 162-70 (1976) (offering an early
plug for the monitoring model); AM. LAW. INST. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Am. Law Inst. 1992) (generally advocating a monitoring model).
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with majorities of outside directors and several “overview” committees comprised
primarily of outside directors to deal with the firm audit, executive compensation, and
director nominations.
The market boom of the 1990s kept investors happily busy counting their money;
perhaps the corporate governance problem was solved. In 2001, though, the stock market
plummeted. Most share prices fell, especially in technology stocks, but investor fury
focused on a few corporate scandals involving shocking misconduct. Congress, the stock
exchanges, and the SEC all responded to investor outrage with new regulations designed
to prevent such fiascos rather than alter the general rules of corporate governance.
Congress enacted the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002, popularly referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). 6 Because many
recent scandals involved false financial statements, Congress required CEOs and CFOs to
certify the accuracy of financial statements to their best knowledge. 7 Because corporate
lawyers and auditors had failed to detect or divulge the shenanigans, SOX imposed rules
to strengthen auditor independence and to demand more assertive action by lawyers who
learn of corporate misconduct. 8 The most direct intrusion into corporate governance is
the requirement that certain actions be approved by an audit committee of the corporate
board consisting entirely of independent directors. 9 The New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the NASDAQ also adopted rules giving a greater role to independent
directors of listed companies. 10
The stock market bottomed out and the economy’s recession ended in 2002; both
have since managed modest recoveries, although share prices remain well below their
pre-crash highs. Once again there is hope that the corporate governance problem has been
conquered. 11 Sober analysis suggests, however, that while the symptoms of defective
corporate governance have moderated, the disease has not been cured. As Paul MacAvoy
and Ira Millstein have put it: “there is a governance mechanism in the engine of the
corporation that is broken . . . . [T]he board was not functioning as agent for investors.” 12
III. THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
A. Managerial Domination
In 1932 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means proclaimed in their groundbreaking The
Modern Corporation and Private Property 13 that a major problem of capitalism was the
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
7. Id. § 404 (requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify certain 1934 Act filings).
8. Id. § 307.
9. Id. §§ 204, 301.
10. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303(A)(3) (2005), available at
http://www.nyse.com/frameset.html?displayPage=/listed/1022221393251.html; NASD, Inc. Manual Rule
4350(c) (2006), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html.
11. For example, the Business Roundtable, the mouthpiece of the corporate establishment, trumpets the
growing number of companies that follow “best practices” in corporate governance. Business Roundtable
Reports Progress in Governance, 8 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) 42 (Apr. 4, 2005).
12. PAUL W. MACAVOY & IRA M. MILLSTEIN, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7, 9
(2003).
13. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
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separation of ownership and control: that is, public companies were not controlled by
their owners, the shareholders, but by the managers, the supposed agents of the
shareholders. Managers often exerted their control to benefit themselves, not
shareholders. Business executives and their minions often deny this thesis. They have
resisted all recent reform initiatives by declaring that corporate governance is
fundamentally sound; only minor tinkering is needed, and corporations are doing this on
their own. 14 This claim is untenable.
First, CEOs influence, if not dominate, the composition and operations of corporate
boards. New directors are typically chosen on the CEO’s recommendation. 15 Most CEOs
can at least veto nominations to the board, and they exclude anyone who might “rock the
boat.” 16 Directors so chosen naturally feel beholden to the CEO who approved them. 17
Most outside directors come from a small elite of current or former CEOs of other
companies. 18 As outside directors they tend to give the CEO the same deference that they
want from outside directors on their own boards. 19 They are wealthy, so they don’t need
the compensation, and fighting lonely and futile battles against a CEO is not most
people’s idea of a good time. Accordingly, if perchance an invitation is issued to
someone who does not expect to go along with the CEO, the candidate will probably
decline the offer.
If independently inclined directors nonetheless sneak onto the board, the traditions
and atmosphere of the board discourage those inclinations and encourage “groupthink.”
Warren Buffett criticizes the prevalence of “an excessively cozy ‘boardroom
atmosphere.’” 20 As one director put it: “Being on a board was like having a merit badge.

PROPERTY (1932).
14. See Business Roundtable Reports Progress in Governance, supra note 11, at 42 (painting a rosy
picture of the state of corporate governance); David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique
of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1028-29 (2000) (stating that corporate
governance is working for investors now). Others make the similar argument that no further changes should be
made until recent reforms have been given time to work. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
15. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 178 (2d ed. 2001); Anil
Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical
Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1835 (1999) (finding direct CEO involvement in selection of directors in 47% of
corporations studied); James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77 (1995).
16. See Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors,
59 BUS. LAW. 95, 100 (2003) (“Even a nominating committee composed entirely of independent directors is not
likely to choose a candidate put forward by shareholders . . . unless the candidate is already known personally . .
. as someone . . . who would ‘not rock the boat.’”).
17. See Nell Minow & Kit Bingham, The Ideal Board, in ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 496, 497 (1995) (“Even the ablest and most honorable directors are inevitably
influenced by the ‘dance with the one who brought you’ syndrome. As long as a director is brought in by the
CEO, he will naturally feel that it is to the CEO that he owes his loyalty.”).
18. See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Small World of the American Corporate Elite, 1982-2001, 1
STRATEGIC ORG. 301 (2003).
19. See Allen Kaufman et al., The Managerial Power Thesis Revised: CEO Compensation and the
Independence of Independent CEO Directors (unpublished manuscript) (Mar. 3, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=678381.
20. Letter from Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders (Feb.
21, 2003), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/message.html. See also James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion,
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You’d fly in for a dinner, pat the CEO on the butt and fly out.” 21 Outside directors fear
that they must go along with management in order to be re-nominated. 22 And, in any
case, a director who does not enjoy backing the CEO will probably resign.
Most boards meet about once a month and do not have their own staff. Accordingly,
management sets the agenda; the board does not initiate, it only reacts. Even in its
monitoring function the board is hampered by its limited time and information. 23 Outside
directors cannot match the managers’ knowledge of the firm, and in reviewing
management proposals the board must rely on the information management deigns to
give. These conditions led Peter Drucker, dean of business management theorists, to
dismiss outside directors as figureheads. 24
Some argue that the states seek corporate franchise fees by offering the best
corporate law. This incentive creates a “race to the top” among the states that guarantee
optimal treatment of investors. 25 However, this market has serious barriers to entry, so it
is doubtful that other states try very hard to challenge Delaware’s dominance.26 Certainly
it is naive to assume that the abundant evidence of serious problems with corporate
governance must be illusory because of a hypothetical but unconfirmed race to the top.
CEO domination of corporate boards may have eased somewhat in the 1980s
because of the proliferation of successful tender offers. 27 However, as SEC Chairman
William H. Donaldson has declared:
Over the past decade or more, the chief executive position has steadily
increased in power and influence. In some cases, the CEO has become more of
a monarch than a manager. Many boards have become gradually more
deferential to the opinions, judgments and decision of the CEO and senior
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 99-108; Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment
from Old Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 930 (2003)
(quoting the Warren Buffett letter); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behaviorial Science
and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37-49 (1981).
21. PATRICK A. REARDON, HARD LESSONS FOR MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS AND PROFESSIONALS 130
(2003) (quoting Robert H. Campbell, former chairman and CEO of Sunoco).
22. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874-75 (1991).
23. See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 141-43 (1976).
24. PETER DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 92 (rev. ed. 1972); see also Michael B. Dorff, Does
One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive
Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 263-69 (2005) (reviewing literature on CEO power).
25. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring
2003, at 30; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
26. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the
Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 563, 570-71, 581 (2002); see also Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the Top/Bottom (Univ. of Utah, Leg. Stud.
Paper No. 05-09, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=662261 (questioning whether there is a race to
either the top or the bottom).
27. This is suggested by an increase in CEO turnover and in the hiring of new CEOs from outside the firm
between 1971 and 1994. See Mark R. Huson et al., Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A
Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265 (2001). Some believe that turnover has further accelerated recently and
infer an “increase in the board’s power vis-à-vis the CEO.” Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If
There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for Compensation: Discussion and Analysis, 30 J. CORP. L.
695 (2005).
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management team. 28
B. The Effects of Managerial Domination
Despite the foregoing, some still deny that managers dominate corporate boards.
More important, even if management domination exists, it is not necessarily a problem.
Perhaps public corporations strive to serve shareholders by maximizing share value.
However, there is abundant evidence that corporations often operate for the benefit of
their managers, not their shareholders.
For one, executive compensation has exploded since 1990 29 and is now frequently
excessive and poorly designed to motivate executives to maximize share value, as
recently documented by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried in Pay without Performance. 30
Some defended the meteoric rise of executive compensation in the 1990s on the ground
that equity values had also mushroomed and that executive pay had become more tightly
tied to performance. 31 However, when profits and equity prices fell from 2001 to 2003,
executive compensation continued to grow. Moreover, as Bebchuk and Fried show, in
many companies executive compensation is not tied to performance. 32 One study
actually finds a negative correlation between compensation and managerial performance

28. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the 2003 Washington Economic Policy
Conference (Mar. 24, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032403whd.htm; see also
Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 17 (stating that the earlier decline of CEO entrenchment may have been
reversed since 1994 by the institution of takeover defenses); Millon, supra note 14, at 1023 (stating that outside
directors tend to defer to the CEO); Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance and Some
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 504-05
(Nancy B. Rapaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter CORPORATE FIASCOES] (stating that “the CEO
has assumed an ever-dominant role in the corporation, culminating in what people have begun to refer to as the
‘imperial’ CEO”); D. Quinn Mills, Paradigm Lost: The Imperial CEO, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 22, 2003,
at 41 (exhorting boards to curb the power of CEOs); Allen Kaufman et al., A Team Production Model of
Corporate Governance Revisited 6 (George Wash. Univ., SMPP Working Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=410080 (stating that CEOs have become more powerful).
29. See John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Insufficient Pay Without Performance? 44-45
(Vand. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=648648 (giving data
on growth of CEO compensation); see also Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay,
21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y. 283 (2005).
30. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). See also MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 75 (stating that
executive compensation was “out of line” by the end of the 1990s); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried,
Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 487, 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=583861 (stating that many companies camouflage deferred compensation
so that investors have difficulty calculating actual compensation); M.P. Narayanan & Hasan Nejat Seyhun, Do
Managers Influence Their Pay? Evidence from Stock Price Reversals Around Executive Stock Options Grants
(Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=649804 (showing that some firms
issue stock options on a back-date basis, picking a past date with a lower stock price than that on the decision
date).
31. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3 (based on statistics through 2001). Holmstrom and Kaplan
concede, however, some problems with executive compensation: growing stock and stock option ownership
encourages managers to manipulate accounting numbers; much executive compensation is too liquid; and “the
size of some of the option grants has been far greater than what is necessary to retain and motivate.” Id. at 1213.
32. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 30, chs. 10-14.
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in large firms with no large shareholders! 33 Excessive compensation also correlates with
weak shareholder rights. 34
Self-dealing by executives is also common and is damaging to their corporations. 35
Public companies provide more sumptuous executive perquisites, like luxurious facilities,
large support staffs, and corporate jets, than do comparable non-public firms. 36 Some
perquisites are difficult to recognize at all. For example, when corporate headquarters are
relocated they are usually moved closer to the CEO’s home despite some evidence that
these moves impair corporate performance. 37
In economic theory corporate funds should be distributed to shareholders unless the
company can invest them with a reasonable expectation of a market rate of return or
better. In practice, though, managers reinvest corporate funds even when they lack
promising projects. 38 Thus returns on reinvested earnings are low; some studies find that
they approach zero. 39 Managers even support double taxation of corporate earnings,
despite its high costs to investors, because ending double taxation would fuel demands
that earnings be paid out unless managers had promising projects to finance. 40 Managers
are more risk-averse than shareholders so they capitalize companies conservatively.
Despite the favorable tax treatment of debt, managers assume no more debt than the firm
can handle. This furthers the managers’ goal of corporate growth. Growth increases
prestige and is used to justify higher compensation and perquisites. 41 It allows the CEO
33. Robert Daines et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill (Aug. 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622223 (stating that some former defenders of the levels of
executive compensation now believe that “the governance system itself is corrupted and tilted in the direction of
management in a way that will almost inevitably lead to excesses in executive pay levels”). See also Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems,
and How to Fix Them 20-21 (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305.
34. Pornsit Jiraporn et al., CEO Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Corporate Governance, 29 J.
ECON. & FIN. 242 (2005).
35. See Elizabeth A. Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance
and Firm Value (Aug. 2004) (European Fin. Ass’n 2004 Maastrict Meetings Paper No. 4377), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=558983 (finding that self-dealing is common and harmful, especially where corporate
governance is weak).
36. See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORMANCE 65-66, 80, 86-87 (1975)
(reviewing prior literature).
37. See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, CITY: REDISCOVERING THE CENTER 287-97 (1989) (noting that of 38 firms
that left New York City in the period studied, 31 moved within eight miles of the CEO’s home, but those firms
lagged in economic performance behind those that stayed).
38. See Diane K. Denis, Twenty-Five Years of Corporate Governance . . . and Counting, 10 REV. FIN.
ECON. 191, 195 (2001) (discussing management’s incentive to make bad investment decisions); William J.
Rafael F. La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1168 (2002)
(concluding that “poor shareholder protection is penalized with lower violations”).
39. See William J. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 REV. ECON. & STATS. 128
(1973); see also William J. Baumol et al., Earnings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52
REV. ECON. & STATS. 345, 354-55 (1970) (showing firms that issued little new equity and had returns on
reinvestment of retained earnings that approached zero).
40. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J.
325, 336 (1995) (stating that “managers may prefer to lobby for other tax measures . . . that may be less
advantageous to shareholders”).
41. See Richard A. Lambert et al., The Structure of Organizational Incentives, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 438,
441-42 (1993) (empirically verifying the ability of many CEOs to inflate their own compensation); Rudiger
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to reward loyal underlings with promotions. 42 An egregious aspect of this “empire
building” is unprofitable acquisitions: on average, purchasers realize no profit from
acquisitions. 43 Finally, corporations deploy takeover defenses despite the damage they do
to share values. The harm from staggered boards and poison pills has been
documented. 44 In general, managerial entrenchment is associated with lower firm value45
and higher CEO compensation. 46 Most firms retain their takeover defenses even when
shareholders vote to request their removal. 47
The foregoing claims are sometimes construed as a charge of managers’ bad faith;
the alleged charge is then denied. Self-serving behavior does not necessarily stem from
venality, though. Most people are optimistic and think well of themselves. 48 Managers
are no exception. 49 Even when acting in good faith they are likely to exaggerate the
benefits of growth and of their own value to the company.
The most touted evidence of persistent problems with corporate governance is the

Fahlenbrach, Shareholder Rights and CEO Compensation (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper
03-05, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=390144 (demonstrating that weak shareholder rights
correlate with higher CEO compensation and faster increases in CEO compensation).
42. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 383-85 (4th ed. 1977);
GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL
GOALS SYSTEM 37 (1984); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS (1975); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
43. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 614 n.5 (2002) (stating that
“studies of acquiring companies stock performance report results ranging from no statistically significant stock
price effect to statistically significant losses” (citation omitted)); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 300-02 (2d ed. 1995). Further, “[a]cquiring firms appear
to suffer negative abnormal returns in the several years following the transaction.” Id. at 309.
44. See Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 430
(2005) (finding that staggered boards are associated with significantly reduced firm value). See generally
Lucian Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 (2003); Kenneth A.
Borokhovich, et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. FIN. 1495 (1997) (showing that
takeover defenses are associated with higher subsequent agency costs and poor performance).
45. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance? (Harvard Law Sch. John M.
Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 (showing that a sixfactor entrenchment index is associated with significantly lower firm value).
46. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 30, at 85-86. See also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mallainathan, Is
There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND. J. ECON. 535 (1999); Paul
Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 144-45 (2003).
47. In 2003, 84 shareholder proposals seeking rescission of, or shareholder approval for, poison pills came
to a vote; 63 received majority support. In 2004, as of October 29, 48 such proposals had come to a vote; 41
received majority support. Andrew R. Brownstein & Igor Kirman, Can a Board Say No When Shareholders Say
Yes? Responding to Majority Vote Resolutions, 60 BUS. LAW. 23, 26-27 (2004).
48. See generally CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds. 2000);
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds. 2002);
Simon Gervais & Terence Odean, Learning To Be Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 1 (2001); J.B. Heaton,
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate,
CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661 (2005); Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis
of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 (1986).
49. See generally Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Biases in
Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 194 (1977); James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial
Perspectives on Risk and Risk-Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 324 (1987).
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spate of corporate scandals that exploded early in this decade: Enron, 50 WorldCom,
Tyco, Adelphia, and ImClone. Defenders of the status quo treat these disasters as
aberrations, not evidence of need for general corporate reform. However, the governance
of the companies rocked by scandals does not seem to have been atypical. In both the
composition and operation of their boards they seem to have followed the accepted “best
practices.” 51
In sum, there is overwhelming evidence that managers of public companies often
can and do obtain corporate action that inures to their benefit and to the detriment of
shareholders. Moreover, although it is impossible to quantify shareholder rights precisely,
they seem to have diminished since 1985. 52
C. The Failure of Past Reforms: The Monitoring Model and the “Independent” Board
This state of affairs exposes the failure of past reforms. For over 20 years champions
of greater corporate accountability to shareholders have succeeded in instituting rules and
instilling attitudes in favor of corporate boards dominated by outside and independent
directors. SEC rules require each company to disclose whether its directors are
independent and whether its board has various oversight committees with majorities of
independent directors. 53 Further, rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ now demand some
elements of director independence. 54 As a result, most large public companies now have
independent majorities on the full board and on standard oversight committees.
However, these changes have not produced greater accountability to shareholders.
Numerous studies have failed to detect any positive correlation between board
independence and corporate financial performance; 55 one study actually found a negative
50. For descriptions of the events at Enron, see Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in CORPORATE
FIASCOES, supra note 28, at 3. For discussion of the legal implications of Enron, see generally CORPORATE
FIASCOES; AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR
CORPORATIONS (Christopher L. Cull & William A. Niskanen eds., 2002). See also William W. Bratton, Enron
and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused
Enron: A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004).
51. See REARDON, supra note 21, at 71-72 (stating that under widely accepted criteria Enron had excellent
outside directors); Bratton, supra note 50, at 1333-34 (stating that Enron’s board followed widely accepted
“best practices”); Paredes, supra note 28, at 504-05 (“[T]he Enron board was on the scene and, for the most
part, taking most of the steps we ask a board to take”). Enron’s directors also owned substantial amounts of its
stock. Outside directors on the audit committee owned on average 18,000 shares each. At Enron’s peak share
price of about $83, 18,000 shares were worth over $1,500,000. See Yaniv Grinstein, Complementary
Perspectives on “Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron,” 89 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 50708 (2004) (providing share ownership figures from Enron’s 2001 proxy statement).
52. See Henry Huang, Shareholder Rights and the Cost of Equity Capital 3 (Aug. 2004) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (stating that “the last two decades have witnessed a trend of restricting
shareholder rights at the firm level in the U.S.”). An index of shareholder rights comprising 24 factors has been
constructed in Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
53. See SEC Regulation S-K, Items 401(a),(d), 404(a),(b), 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401(a),(d), 404(a),(b) (2005).
54. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
55. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43, 63-64 (2003)
(discussing empirical literature); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); David F. Larcker et al., How Important Is
Corporate Governance? (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=595821
(finding little correlation between corporate performance and several common measures of corporate
governance quality); Kaufman et al., supra note 19, at 8 (stating that after some point a greater number of
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correlation. Many directors still have “soft” conflicts of interest despite tightening
definitions of “independence.” 56 When Michael Ovitz asked whether the Disney board
would approve the lavish contract that CEO Michael Eisner proposed for him, “Eisner
laughed, ticking off the various ways that board members were beholden to him, and
assuring Ovitz that they would do what he wanted.” 57 And while rules defining
independence may be too porous, allowing many conflicts of interest to seep through,
they may also be too tight in some ways, barring the best candidates because of relatively
minor affiliations. 58
The lack of progress in corporate governance despite the growing number of
independent directors persuaded some that reforms just had not gone far enough.
Accordingly, definitions of “independence” were repeatedly tightened and requirements
for board independence repeatedly ratcheted up. This effort has continued with the
imposition of new requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 59 Some argue for further
steps in this direction. 60 Others oppose further reform now so that the recent changes
have time to work. 61
This approach is doomed to fail. The fatal flaw is that “independence” can be
defined only as absence of affiliation between a director and corporate management. No
definition or rule can make directors act zealously for shareholders, 62 and in current

outside directors is associated with reduced firm performance); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and
Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 284-90 (1996). See also Alton B. Harris & Andrea S.
Kramer, Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FROM THE
COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS 49, 76 (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen
eds., 2002) (stating that repeated increases in board independence have not worked).
56. See Paredes, supra note 28, at 510-11 (noting that independence is sometimes undermined by
corporate charitable contributions to an institution with which a director is affiliated, consulting and other
business arrangements between the company and its directors, or personal and social ties). For example, even
remote links in board membership between a CEO and outside directors are associated with higher
compensation for the CEO. David F. Larcker et al., Back Door Links Between Directors and Executive
Compensation (Feb. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=671063. Such soft
conflicts seem to have existed at firms recently rocked by scandals. See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 164-65
(2005). See generally Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects of
Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935 (2003).
57. James B. Stewart, Partners: Eisner, Ovitz, and the Disney Wars, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 46,
48.
58. For example, SOX treats Warren Buffett as a “conflicted” member of the audit committee of the board
of Coca-Cola, Inc. because he controls companies that do business with Coke. See Edward Iwata, Businesses
Say Corporate Governance Can Go Too Far, USA TODAY, June 24, 2004, at 1B.
59. See Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
60. See Paredes, supra note 28, at 522 (“[T]here are still gaps in the tightened definition of independence
in Sarbanes-Oxley.”); J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of
Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 376-79 (2004) (proposing tighter federal regulation of self-dealing
and a federal mandate for independent nominating committees).
61. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67, 89-90 (2003) (“[I]t seems only prudent to take the time to assess
the impact of the far-reaching reforms that have just been adopted.”); Task Force on S’holder Proposals of the
Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., Section of Bus. Law of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Report on Proposed Changes in Proxy
Rules and Regulations Regarding Procedures for the Election of Corporate Directors, 59 BUS. LAW. 109
(2003) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report] (semble).
62. See MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 33 (stating that lack of affiliation is not enough to
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circumstances they are unlikely to do so. “Independent” directors cannot know the firm
as insiders do. They rarely own much company stock, so they have little personal stake in
the stock’s value. To quarrel with management is unpleasant. Going along with the CEO
and ignoring share value has no disagreeable consequences, and management has more
influence than shareholders over the outside directors’ renomination and reelection.
Similarly, tackling managerial self-dealing with prohibitions is inevitably flawed
because definitions of self-dealing are always both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.
As an example of the latter, SOX forbids companies to make loans to executives, 63 but
loans can be a useful element of compensation. Moreover, SOX has had some absurd
consequences. For example, the ban on loans literally bars advances of travel expenses.
Likewise, although takeover defenses are now harmful to shareholders, 64 to ban all
shark repellants would be unwise. If directors were truly independent and competent,
poison pills might give them time to seek higher bids. Some form of job protection for
executives may also benefit shareholders. 65 To get effective boards we need a new
approach that gives directors incentives to be zealous and the discretion to adopt wise
policies.
D. Support for Managerial Domination
1. Traditional Managerialism
Some applaud the separation of ownership and control. In the 1930s Merrick Dodd
argued that corporations should serve the public as well as shareholders; accordingly,
managers should have discretion to serve the interests of other constituencies and not be
beholden to investors alone. 66 As Berle and Means showed, managerialism was an
accurate model of how corporate governance actually worked, but its normative appeal
was always limited. In response to Dodd, Berle criticized the lack of accountability of
managers in the managerialist model. It was unwise, he insisted, to grant managers
immense power with little constraint beyond a “pious wish” that something good come of

assure good director performance); Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 49 (“[I]ndependence of directors from the firm’s
executives does not imply that the directors are dependent on shareholders or otherwise induced to focus solely
on shareholder interests.”); Bratton, supra note 50, at 1334 (stating that no standard of independence can
guarantee effective effort by directors); Enriques, supra note 20, at 927 (arguing that “no definition of
independence will ever assure that an independent director will indeed act as such”); Pozen, supra note 16, at
98-99 (stating that “formal affiliation to the company“ is not what determines the quality of a director).
63. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §402, 116 Stat. 745.
64. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
65. See Sudheer Chava et al., Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans? (European Fin.
Ass’n, 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 5061, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=495853
(showing that weak shareholder rights are associated with lower interests rates on bank loans); John E. Core et
al., Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and
Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655 (2006) (showing that shareholders may benefit from job protections for
executives).
66. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
See also Gordon Donaldson, Financial Goals: Management vs. Stockholders, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June
1963, at 116; Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1477 (1958) (reviewing J.A. LIVINGSTON,
THE AMERICAN STOCK HOLDER (1952)).
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it. 67 Even the American Law Institute eventually embraced the view that the goal of
corporate governance was “enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.” 68
2. The Team Production (or Mediating) Model
A modern variation on managerialism is the team production (or mediating) model
of corporate governance. 69 It is sometimes called the director primacy model, 70 but this
label is misleading because directors as such do not, and probably cannot, exercise much
control. 71 Like the old managerialists, team production theorists argue that boards should
mediate among the corporation’s various constituencies. 72 However, the old
managerialism stemmed from socio-political concerns: it favored managerial control in
order to achieve a socially desirable division between shareholders and other
constituencies of the benefits flowing from the corporation. The team production model
places more weight on economics.
First, team production theory posits that corporations need non-shareholder
constituencies (often called “stakeholders”) 73 to make commitments that would expose
them to exploitation by shareholder dominated boards. 74 Unlike shareholders,
stakeholders are not diversified; if mistreated, they cannot simply withdraw their
commitments as shareholders can by selling their stock. 75 Accordingly, these
stakeholders need protection through a corporate governance system that leaves directors
broad discretion rather than slavishly pursuing the goal of maximization of share value.
In fact, stakeholders need not fear exploitation by shareholders. Both shareholders
and stakeholders generally benefit from the maximization of share price. The most
profitable companies tend to offer the best employee compensation and opportunities for
promotion. 76 And firms that “contract with their stakeholders on the basis of mutual trust

67. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365,
1368 (1932).
68. AM. LAW INST., supra note 5, § 2.01.
69. Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 87 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (discussing the need to protect
the firm from predation by any constituency); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Governance, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Kaufman et al., supra note 19.
70. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
71. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
72. See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive
Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 715 (2004) (referring to directors as “mediating hierarchs”).
73. The very definition of the term is problematic. See R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and
“The Corporate Objective Revisited,” 15 ORG. SCI. 364, 365 (2002) (“[S]takeholder theory can be many things
to many people.”); Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience:
Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 853 (1997) (finding 27 different
definitions of “stakeholder”).
74. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
75. Interestingly, the frequent claim of team production theorists that shareholders are less vulnerable than
other stakeholders—because they can withdraw their investment in the company by selling their stock—is
contradicted by some team production theorists who defend the corporate form (including the separation of
ownership and control) on the ground that it locks in shareholders by preventing them from withdrawing their
capital without board action. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
76. See Olubunmi Faleye et al., When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance (Nat’l Bureau of
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and cooperation . . . will have a competitive advantage.” 77 To mistreat employees,
customers, or suppliers would be to impair the shareholders’ own interests. 78 If such
exploitation did result from shareholder control, we would see evidence of it after
takeovers. However, blue collar employment and wages do not decline after takeovers. 79
Some team production theorists concede that in both the team production and the
shareholder primacy models the goal of corporate governance is the same: to maximize
firm value. 80 The only difference is semantic, but “language matters” because it sends
“social signals” that induce essential cooperation from stakeholders and also enhance the
ethics of team members. 81 It seems doubtful that language matters enough to warrant the
major differences in the locus of corporate control that the two theories posit. More
important, this analysis begs the question of why shareholders and (manager-dominated)
boards clash over executive compensation and disposition of free cash flow. Clearly,
investors dislike the status quo defended by team production theorists in ways that go
beyond rhetoric.
Contrary to team production theory, shareholders have more reason to fear
exploitation than do employees and other stakeholders. Employees have contracts
specifying their compensation. True, employees make a commitment to the firm that can
reduce the value of their human capital (i.e., their labor) outside the firm, thus exposing
themselves to opportunism. 82 However, most employees retain substantial market value
for their labor. Indeed, the job skills they acquire often enhance their market value. That
is why employers often need non-competition clauses to limit the freedom of employees
to switch jobs. 83 Even workers who lack a better alternative opportunity are not
defenseless; they can simply slacken in their work. All employers know that a sullen and
resentful workforce is less productive and profitable.
Suppliers, customers, and lenders also have ample protections from exploitation.
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W11254, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=697179 (stating that
labor-controlled public firms grow more slowly and create fewer new jobs than other public firms). See
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 420-21 (stating that “pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization often redounds
to the benefit of nonshareholder constituencies” and that in a hypothetical bargain among all corporate
stakeholders “we would expect a bargain to be struck in which shareholder wealth maximization is the chosen
norm”).
77. Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 353
(2002).
78. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 811, 863 (1992) (“In the long run, shareholders can’t systematically exploit other ‘stakeholders’ in the
corporate enterprise” because doing so would damage the shareholders’ own interests.).
79. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 43, at 625 (citing studies showing that “wages and employment of
blue collar workers in plants subject to takeovers declined relative to non-takeover plants prior to the takeover,
but grew more quickly after the takeover”). White collar employment may decline after takeovers. See id.
However, this is probably a result not of mistreatment by the acquirer but of overstaffing as part of the empire
building of pre-acquisition management.
80. Margaret M. Blair, Directors’ Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language Matters, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 885, 900 (2003).
81. Id. at 900-08.
82. See Kaufman et al., supra note 19, at 13 (noting that since “each member’s skills remain valuable only
within the context of the team (and the firm and industry), individuals cannot threaten to quit and join another
effort”).
83. See 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 13.4 (2005) (discussing the use of covenants by
employees not to compete so as to protect the employer from a diversion of confidential information).
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Suppliers and customers can demand contractual protection and simply refuse to deal
with a company that behaves improperly. Suppliers can also charge more for their inputs.
Both can injure a company’s reputation—a crucial asset for most firms—by public
criticism. Lenders (at least of private debt) insist on “elaborate covenants that give them a
large role in the affairs of the corporation.” 84
Shareholders’ exposure is much greater. They have no contractual right to fixed
payouts; they get only the residue (if any) that those in control generate and deign to
distribute. Only stockholders have “the perspective of the aggregate.” 85 Moreover, the
shareholders’ input is complete once they buy the firm’s stock. An employee can
withdraw her input by quitting the firm, but shareholders can’t withdraw their capital. 86
That is why equity owners alone elect the firm’s directors. If the team production model
was valid, employees and perhaps other stakeholders would share that right either by
statute or by contract. In fact, they do not.
Team production theory also maintains that shareholders tie their own hands by
ceding control to autonomous boards of directors in order to assure other constituencies
that they will not be exploited. 87 This is far-fetched. If ceding control were necessary to
corporate success, companies with controlling shareholders would not be viable unless
those shareholders renounced control and walled themselves off from takeover bids with
poison pills. That does not happen. Shareholders who own enough shares to exercise
control do so. 88
Neither do public shareholders voluntarily forswear influence. In particular, they
actively fight antitakeover provisions. Team production theorists deny that this behavior
belies their claims. They argue that investors welcome poison pills and other “shark
repellants” when companies go public. 89 Efforts to remove antitakeover devices, they
84. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate
Governance 1 (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-08, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=692023. See also id. at 8 (“These loan agreements define defaults in ways that give
creditors as much control over the board and its decisions as shareholders.”).
85. Bayless Manning, Thinking Straight About Corporate Law Reform, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,
20-23 (1977). See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 469-70. “[S]hareholders are the only corporate
constituency with a residual, unfixed, ex post claim on corporate assets and earnings.” Therefore, “shareholders
have the strongest economic incentive to care about the size of the residual claim, which means that they have
the greatest incentive to elect directors committed to maximizing firm profitability.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
86. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 471 (stating that “job mobility” gives some protection to
employees). An individual shareholder or the body of shareholders can disinvest by selling their stock to
another investor, but the price paid reflects the purchaser’s expectations of future payouts. More important,
neither individual nor aggregate sales of stock withdraw capital from the company; they simply change the
identity of the stockholders.
87. See Bainbridge, supra note 70, at 547 (stating that shareholders realize that corporate governance
would suffer if they exerted control); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 685-86 (2003).
Some who do not espouse the team production theory still share its views about the role of the board. See
Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 79 (trumpeting “the need to have a body that balances a wide array of
competing interests, both among the shareholders themselves and between shareholders and other
constituencies”).
88. Institutional investors, especially hedge funds, are increasingly demanding board representation on
public companies. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, BUS. WK., Feb. 20, 2006, at
72.
89. See Stout, supra note 87, at 698-702.
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claim, are simply attempts to renege on the promises implicitly made to other
stakeholders. 90 If this thesis were true, shareholders would attack poison pills only after a
takeover bid is made. To rescind a pill sooner would cause stakeholders to abandon their
commitment to the firm, thereby damaging the firm’s share price. In fact, though,
investors do battle poison pills even when there is no bid. When they succeed, share price
does not fall, and I know of no evidence that rescission causes stakeholders to reduce
their commitment to the firm. Investors have reasons to oppose antitakeover provisions
apart from exploitation of stakeholders. Companies with strong antitakeover provisions
are, for example, more likely to make unprofitable acquisitions. 91
It is also argued that shareholders tie their own hands in order to avoid fighting
among themselves over their conflicting interests and goals. This too is wrong; in fact,
the interests of shareholders are remarkably uniform. 92 Claims that investors promote
detrimental “short-termism” are also ill-founded. 93 A powerful shareholder presence is
actually associated with better corporate financial performance in several respects. 94
Others maintain that institutional investors lack incentives to seek influence in corporate
governance. 95 However, investors value shareholder rights, as evidenced by the impact
of these rights on share prices. 96 These claims are further belied by the increasing

90. Id. at 705.
91. See Ronald W. Masulis et al., Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 116/2006, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=697501 (reporting
an empirical study); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing damage from takeover defenses).
92. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
93. See Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporate Law 9-10 (Stanford Law & Econ.
Olin Working Paper No. 307, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=732832 (“[C]ompetition among
investors who do not suffer from a short-term bias will drive stock price toward an unbiased level.”).
94. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE 237-38 (1994) (stating that the presence of large block holders often improves corporate
performance); Paul Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229
(2001) (finding higher stock returns for companies with large institutional ownership); Thomas Moeller, Let’s
Make a Deal: How Shareholder Control Impacts Merger Payoffs, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 167, 167 (2005) (presenting
study showing that “the presence of large outside blockholders . . . is positively correlated with takeover
premiums”); Robert Daines et al., supra note 33 (showing that firms with large shareholders and high incentive
pay tend to perform better); ROE, supra (stating that the available evidence strongly suggests that institutional
investors are not systematically myopic; investors react favorably to increased firm spending on research and
development, and institutional investors hold more than their pro rata share of stocks of R&D-intensive firms).
On the other hand, antitakeover devices and other indicia of management entrenchment are associated with poor
corporate performance. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A
Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535 (1999) (showing that stringent antitakeover laws
weaken managements’ incentive to control labor costs); Core et al., supra note 65 (describing a study finding
that firms with stronger antitakeover provisions have poorer operating performance); Gerald T. Garvey &
Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm
Leverage, 54 J. FIN. 519, 520 (1999) (stating that antitakeover laws “allow managers to pursue goals other than
maximizing shareholder wealth”); Masulis et al., supra note 91 (study showing negative correlation between the
strength of a firm’s antitakeover provisions and profitability of its acquisitions).
95. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 866 (claiming that diversified investors care only about
their total portfolios, not about individual companies); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 474 (1991) (arguing that index funds
compete by powering costs and therefore avoid the costs of participating in corporate governance).
96. See Huang, supra note 52, at 29 (presenting a study showing that “the level of shareholder rights is
significantly associated with the cost of equity capital. Investors perceive the weak shareholder rights as an
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activism of institutional investors and the growing support for shareholder proposals to
limit antitakeover devices. 97 The activism of institutional investors, though limited, is
impressive given the many obstacles it encounters. First, assertive shareholders can
provoke CEOs who are jealous of their power and can punish unruly institutions. 98
Second, activism incurs out-of-pocket costs. Since even huge institutions typically own
an infinitesimal fraction of the portfolio company’s stock, the institutions can hope to
cover these costs by increasing the value of the portfolio company’s stock only on
matters of exceptional financial importance. 99
The law further hinders shareholder participation in corporate governance. The
federal proxy rules treat anything more than de minimis contacts among shareholders as
proxy solicitations, 100 which require a filing with the SEC and detailed disclosures.101
Shareholders who collaborate may incur further duties and liabilities. If they own an
aggregate of more than 5% of a company’s stock, they may be deemed to be “act[ing] as
a . . . group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities” of the
company 102 and therefore required to file disclosure documents with the SEC. 103 They
may also become subject to liability as “controlling persons” 104 or as “insiders.” 105 They

important source of potential agency costs and demand higher rates of return accordingly.”). See also Core et
al., supra note 65 (showing that analysts weigh shareholder rights in making earnings forecasts).
97. See Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals Post-Enron: What’s Changed,
What’s the Same? (Vanderbilt Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-30, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=868652 (documenting growing support for shareholder proposals, especially those
opposing antitakeover devices).
98. For example, the CEO can withhold information and management fees for the company’s pension plan
from disfavored institutions. See Pozen, supra note 16, at 97; see also Bernard Black, Agents Watching Agents:
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 826 (1992) (stating that money managers
that vote against management “are likely to lose any business that they conduct with the company”); Gerald F.
Davis & E. Han Kim, Would Mutual Funds Bite the Hand That Feeds Them? Business Ties and Proxy Voting
(Feb. 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=667625 (presenting study
showing that mutual funds that manage a large volume of pension funds are less likely to vote against
management).
99. See Pozen, supra note 16, at 96-97 (detailing costs of shareholder activism to investors in terms of
money and managerial time).
100. SEC rule 14a-1(l)(1)(iii) defines “solicitation” to include any “communication to security holders
under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.”
17 C.F.R § 240.14-a1(l)(1)(iii) (2005). There are several exemptions, including Rule 14a-2(b)(2): “any
solicitation made otherwise than on behalf of the registrant where the total number of persons solicited is not
more than ten.” Id. § 240.14-a2(b)(2).
101. Id. § 240.14a-4 (prescribing the form of proxies); id. § 240.14a-6 (prescribing filing requirements). See
Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 536-56 (1990) (discussing burdens
of proxy rules on shareholder communications); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 894 (semble); ROE,
supra note 94, at 274 (semble).
102. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d)(3) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2000)).
103. Id. § 13(d)(1) (requiring initial filing); id. § 13(d)(2) (requiring additional filings “[i]f any material
change occurs in the facts set forth in the [previously filed] statements”).
104. Securities Act of 1933 ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, § 15, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2000));
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2000)).
105. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000) (imposing liability for short-swing trading
profits by insiders); and Securities Exchange Act § 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(A) (2000); id. § 21A, 15 U.S.C. §
78u(A) (2000); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b5-1, 240.10b5-2 (2005) (forbidding trading by insiders on
material non-public information).
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can also trigger disabilities and liability under poison pills and state antitakeover laws. 106
Nonetheless, there is evidence that, when it occurs, shareholder activism is beneficial to
firm performance. 107
Other Pollyannas make the contradictory claim that investors are content because
they already have ample power. 108 This claim is also false, as demonstrated by the
support of investors for proposed SEC rule 14a-11. 109 Proxy fights for control are rare,
especially in larger public companies. 110 Defenders of the status quo also argue that
investors have no cause for complaint because if they are dissatisfied with management
of a firm they can sell its stock. 111 The sale price, however, reflects the quality of
management. If management is poor, the investor will get a low price.
To the extent that investors accede to management domination it less likely reflects
a calculation of their own interests than a concession to the awkwardness and futility of
seeking fundamental change. Again, even minor increases in shareholder influence have
been hard to obtain, impossible except in times of public outcry triggered by a corporate
crisis. Further, although investors do not identify with managers, they do both play in the
same business game, a game with age-old rules. To seek more than minor changes in
these rules is frowned upon by all the competing teams in this league. Indeed, it is always
hard even to think about fundamental changes in habits that have acquired a thick patina
of tradition over decades or centuries.
Team production theory champions the “director primacy” of an independent board,
but independent directors do not dominate corporate boards now and never have. 112
When managers dominate boards, the team production theory is unworkable. Team
production theorists posit that directors will behave altruistically. 113 However, there is no
reason to think that managers would exert their power for the benefit of constituencies
other than themselves, and there is no empirical evidence that they do so. 114 Team
106. See Black, supra note 101, at 550-51, 556-59.
107. See Christopher Palmeri, Meet the Friendly Corporate Raiders, BUS. WK., Sept. 20, 2004, at 102
(describing the success of the Relational Investing fund in pressuring underperforming companies to improve).
108. See Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for
Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163, 165 (1991) (stating that “the proxy voting system already provides
shareholders with an effective voice in corporate governance”); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 92-94
(semble); see also RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC
CEOS xii-xiii (2002) (claiming that institutional investors have excessive power and use that power to saddle
CEOs with “unreasonable expectations” then firing them when they “fail to meet such extravagant
expectations”).
109. See Roberta Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Directors?, 60
BUS. LAW. 1, 10-11 (2004); infra notes 141-157 and accompanying text (discussing proposed rule 14a-11).
110. See Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 45-46 (concluding that in a seven-year period only about 80 companies
had proxy fights for control, and only 10 of those had market capitalization over $200 million); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder Franchise 7-14 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=829804.
111. See Letter from Henry A. McKinell, Chairman, Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary., Sec. &
Exchange Comm. (Dec. 22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt122203.htm.
112. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
113. See Licht, supra note 72, at 715 (positing that people’s conduct is “altruistic” in accordance with the
principle of “fairness”).
114. Berle and Means recognized this danger. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Bebchuk,
supra note 55, at 59 (“[T]here is no reason to think that reduced accountability to shareholders would translate
into increased attention to stakeholders . . . . The interests of directors and executives are even less aligned with
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production theorists have offered no technique for producing a board that truly would be
independent. Past corporate governance movements dedicated to other constituencies or
to the “public interest” have foundered on the same rock. 115 The problem is particularly
acute because the interests of other constituencies conflict. 116 Even if some method could
guarantee director independence, directors might not exercise their discretion for the
benefit of non-shareholder constituencies; they might act for their own benefit. 117 Until
this problem is resolved, the team production theory and related models are untenable;
shareholder primacy and managerial control are the only options realistically available.
Another claim of team production theorists (shared with many defenders of the
corporate establishment) is that many, if not most, shareholders value short-term profits
over maximization of long-term share value. 118 Recognizing this reality, the law
confirms the weak role of shareholders in corporate governance by making it difficult for
them to influence elections to the board or to hold directors liable for actions the
shareholders dislike. 119 In fact, however, there is no empirical evidence that myopic
shareholder short-termism is “of significant magnitude.” 120 Some investors do stress
short-term corporate performance; some investors also focus on astrology or pester
managers about obscure social causes. There is no evidence that these groups are more
than a small minority with little power.
Critics charge that many investors seek a “short-term pop in the company’s share
price,” 121 so that they can bail out before markets realize the firm’s long-term
weaknesses. This claim rests on several dubious premises. First, it assumes that securities
markets focus on short-term performance. If that were so, it should be easy for rational

the interest of stakeholders than they are aligned with the interests of shareholders.”); Giovanni Cespa &
Giacinta Cestone, Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests Between
Shareholders and Stakeholders (Universitat Pomper Fabra Econ. & Bus. Working Paper No. 634, 2002),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=394300; EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 19 (“[I]t is only the shareholders’
role that prevents . . . a de jure self-perpetuating oligarchy.”). For evidence of the self-serving use of managers’
power, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
115. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 688-90 (1986) (stating that “social responsibility”
advocates have been vague about goals and inconsistent about means); Berle, supra note 67, at 1367; William
W. Bratton, Welfare, Dialectic, and Mediation in Corporate Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 73-74 (2005)
(stating that past and present critics of shareholder primacy “have never managed to produce an alternative
model that surmounts coherence objections and resonates in the context of our social settlement”).
116. See Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 77, at 354. They also do not need a voice on the board because
their interests are protected by contract while those of shareholders are not. See id. at 355-56.
117. See Millon, supra note 14, at 1042; see also Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duties, 43
U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303 (1993) (stating that a requirement that management consider all constituencies “[i]s
essentially vacuous, because it allows management to justify almost any action on the grounds that it benefits
some group”); Licht, supra note 72, at 707 (semble).
118. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 78 (Some investors “may seek to push the corporation into
steps designed to create a short-term pop in the company’s share price.”); Eduard Gracia, Corporate Short-Term
Thinking
and
the
Winner-Take-All
Market
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=445260; Harvard Symposium on Corporate Elections, supra note 2, at 8 (comments of
Martin Lipton) (stating that shareholders pressure managers to maximize quarterly earnings and to exaggerate
reported earnings); Rosenbaum, supra note 108, at 178 (“[M]ost money managers have an interest in short-term
gains, even at the expense of broader or longer term values.”).
119. See Stout, supra note 87, at 692-94.
120. Symposium on Corporate Elections, supra note 2 (comments of Lucian Bebchuk).
121. See Lipton & Rosenbaum, supra note 61, at 78.
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investors to identify stocks that are over- or under-priced; that does not seem to be the
case. 122 Second, it assumes that investors who pressure managers to accentuate the short
term plan and are able to bail out before the short-term bubble bursts, which in turn
assumes that they know something the rest of the market does not know. No evidence has
been offered to support either assumption. Finally, this hypothesis assumes that after
these “short-termers” bail out of an overpriced stock they can identify and purchase other
stocks that are not overpriced, which in turn assumes that the “short-termers” can
consistently outperform the market. Again, no evidence is offered to support these
assumptions.
When shareholders do focus on quarterly earnings, it is more an effect than a cause
of separation of ownership and control. People pay more attention to daily weather
reports than to climate because they can adjust their plans to deal with the weather, but
they can do little about climate. Similarly, some investors may stress the short term
because they have so little influence over corporate strategy. Even if a firm’s long-term
strategy succeeds, investors cannot be sure they will ever see the benefits; managers often
fritter away profits on empire-building rather than increasing dividends. 123
It is unnecessary, though, to refute completely allegations of shareholder shorttermism. The question is not whether shareholder attitudes and behavior are perfect, but
whether investor control is better than any alternative. Of course, managers often charge
that investors pressure them to stress the short term, and some may believe these claims,
but that does not make the charges true. Indeed, if managers overemphasize the short
term it may be for their own benefit, not to obey investor demands. 124 Executives of a
poorly performing firm may doctor their reports in order to deflect just criticism from
directors and shareholders. In so doing they may also temporarily fool the securities
markets, thereby enabling themselves to unload stock and options at inflated prices. Such
behavior seems to have been common among executives of companies hit by the recent
scandals. 125 When the truth emerges, the stock price plummets. The executives may have
bailed out of the stock, but public investors are stuck. They gain nothing from short-term
hype unless they are tipped and also bail out; there is little evidence that this happens
often.
Short-termism could occur because “managers cannot transmit proprietary, complex,
122. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 43, at 135 (stating that a corollary of the semi-strong form of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis is that “[y]ou can’t consistently beat the market by picking particular stocks
that you think are undervalued”).
123. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984) (arguing that waste of free cash flow
helps explain the apparent under-pricing of shares of some public companies).
124. See Bratton, supra note 50, at 1328 (“Enron’s managers’ obsession with short-term numbers”
stemmed in part from “Enron’s performance-based bonus scheme.”); Black, supra note 78, at 865 (“Managerial
myopia is a serious concern.”); cf. Gracia, supra note 118 (ascribing short-termism to globalization and the
intensifying competition of the “winner take all” market, not to shareholder pressures).
125. Managers manipulate the timing of disclosures to maximize their profits on stock options. See David
Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 73 (2000); Keith Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock
Option Grants, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2001); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT.
SCI. 802 (2005); D. Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements,
52 J. FIN. 449 (1997); see generally ROBERT H. TILLMAN & MICHAEL L. INDERGAARD, PUMP AND DUMP: THE
RANCID RULES OF THE NEW ECONOMY (2005).
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and technological information well to distant, atomized shareholders.” 126 If so, however,
“[t]he large shareholder would . . . protect managers from outsiders who would secondguess truly profitable long-run investments.” 127 Outside directors currently lack the
credibility to reassure investors of the wisdom of management’s strategy.
In sum, then, managers may seek artificially to boost share price temporarily or
invest corporate funds in unprofitable empire-building for their own benefit. Outside
directors typically own little stock, so they have little incentive to resist these managerial
tendencies; they generally defer to management, especially in forming the firm’s business
plan. The shareholders’ interest is to maximize (long-term) share price, which coincides
with society’s interest in corporations. 128
Some ascribe a more general irrationality to investors. 129 True, investors are human
beings, and humans are not perfectly rational. For that very reason, though, these attacks
on shareholder primacy are attacks on a straw man. The question is not whether
shareholder primacy is perfect, but whether there is a better alternative. As the current
problems of corporate governance show, managerial primacy does not meet that test. 130
Nor is there any theoretical basis or empirical evidence that shareholder influence
inflicts the harm to other corporate constituencies that team production theory predicts.
Investors appreciate that abusing other constituencies would rebound to the investors’
detriment. Indeed, “[o]nly residual cash flow claimants have the incentive to maximize
the total value of the firm.” 131 On average, employees are not harmed by leveraged
buyouts or unsolicited takeovers, in which domination of the board typically passes from
management to a controlling shareholder. 132 In recognition of these facts, some team
production theorists concede that their model differs from the shareholder primacy model
only in its rhetoric. 133 Simply weakening shareholders’ voice in choosing the board does
126. ROE, supra note 94, at 13.
127. Id. at 241. See also id. at 12-13, 244-45, 247.
128. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (“[T]here is convergence on a consensus that the best
means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly
accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests.”). In 1997 the Business
Roundtable adopted this position after years of opposition to it. Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3. Support for
this conclusion is also growing outside the United States. See Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the
Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV. 49, 49-50 (2005).
129. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); Nicholas Barberis & Richard H. Thaler, A
Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053, 1055 (George
Constantinides et al. eds., 2003).
130. See supra Part III.B.
131. Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 77, at 353. Other constituencies might favor “unrelated
diversification” and be excessively risk averse. Id. at 354. But see Kaufman et al., supra note 19, at 15 (denying
that shareholders “provide risk capital,” that their investments are “unprotected,” and that they “bear residual
risk”).
132. See Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 297, 317-25 (1993) (concluding that takeovers don’t harm stakeholders much, if at all); Roberta
Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 133-43 (1992)
(same).
133. See Blair, supra note 80; see also Freeman et al., supra note 73, at 366 (stating that there is no need to
treat shareholder value and stakeholder value as “oppositional”).
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nothing to assure that directors will pay any heed to stakeholders. Since most outsiders
own little stock, they have little to lose if stakeholders are mistreated and leave the firm
or render suboptimal performance.
IV. RECENT AND PROPOSED REFORMS
The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and adoption of new stock exchange rules
have not satisfied many critics of corporate governance. The SEC has proposed a rule to
enhance shareholder influence in board elections, and many commentators have urged
further reforms. None of these proposals is likely to be effective.
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act takes some useful steps. It will improve financial reporting
and diminish the liquidity of executives’ stock. 134 But SOX is no panacea. Its goals are
quite modest, being limited primarily to deterring and catching illegal acts. 135 It does not
change rules for board composition or selection. 136 Further, whatever benefits SOX
generates come at substantial cost. There are out-of-pocket costs for the higher auditing
fees necessitated by SOX’s new accounting requirements. 137 SOX seems to be behind
the recent sharp rise in the cost of D&O insurance. 138 For large companies these costs
may not be material, but they are large enough to persuade many smaller public
companies to go private. 139 It may also be causing many foreign companies to cease
listing on American stock exchanges. In sum, SOX is not the solution to the corporate
governance problem. 140
134. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 20.
135. Even there it is not likely to be very effective. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson,
Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley § 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299.
136. See Brown, supra note 60, at 317-21, 338-49, 358-74. SOX also does not authorize shareholder suits;
it can be enforced only by the SEC, which is already so busy that it cannot pursue many substantial claims. See
MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 105.
137. See Section 404 Costs Exceed Estimates, FEI Finds, Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) 38 (Apr. 4, 2005)
(reporting a study finding that for large public companies, costs of one year’s compliance with section 404 of
SOX averaged $4.36 million, almost 40% more than these companies had estimated in July 2004); William J.
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of ‘Going Private’ 7 (Emory Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 05-4, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=672761 (documenting rising accounting
costs imposed by SOX).
138. See id. at 6. But see Peter C. Hsu, Going Private—A Response to an Increased Regulatory Burden?
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 04-16, 2004) (offering a study showing that avoiding
regulatory costs on public companies is not the primary motive for most going private transactions).
139. See Claudia H. Deutsch, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, at 5
(documenting the growing number of smaller public companies going private because of SOX); Carney, supra
note 137 (discussing costs imposed by SOX and its effect of causing many companies to go private); Vidhi
Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, Corporate Governance and Firm Value—The Impact of the 2002 Governance
Rules (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript from the American Finance Association’s 2006 Boston meetings),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556990 (stating that share prices rose for big firms forced by SOX to make
changes, but that prices of smaller public companies fell); James S. Linck et al., Effects and Unintended
Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Corporate Boards (Aug. 31, 2005) (unpublished manuscript from
the American Finance Association’s 2006 Boston meetings), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687496.
140. See MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 1; Brett H. McDonnell, Sarbanes-Oxley, Fiduciary
Duties, and the Conduct of Officers and Directors 1 n.3 (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-13, 2004),
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B. Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11
The SEC has proposed a new rule, 14a-11, which would allow certain shareholders
to nominate one or two directors under certain circumstances. 141 The first problem with
rule 14a-11 as a fix for corporate governance is that it may never be adopted in its
proposed form, if at all. 142 The corporate establishment is solidly against it. It urges the
SEC to delay action until the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley and other recent reforms can be
gauged. 143 It also charges that 14a-11 will result in the election of directors with special
interests “that may conflict with the best interests of the public corporation and its
shareholder body and other constituencies.” 144 The institutional investors who back these
directors may engage in self-dealing. 145 The rule will impose substantial monetary costs,
including expensive proxy fights. 146 It will spawn tension and undermine cooperation
between directors and managers. 147 This tension and the unpleasantness of proxy fights
will dissuade the best board candidates from serving. 148 Increased pressure on CEOs and
boards will make them excessively risk-averse. 149 Although the Commission has made
no final determination on the proposal, recent related acts do not bode well for 14a-11. 150
These fears are overblown. 151 The rule will allow substantial shareholders to
nominate directors, but they must still be elected by the whole body of shareholders. The
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=570321; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-032, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101.
141. Security Holder Direct or Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784
(proposed Oct. 23, 2003).
142. Patrick McGurn, executive vice president of Institutional Shareholder Services, says the proposal “not
just looks dead, but it is dead.” ISS’s Proxy Season Preview Features New Voting Policy, 20 Corp. Counsel
Weekly (BNA) 94 (Mar. 23, 2005). See also SEC Access Proposal Seen as Dead; Some Shift Focus to
Requiring Majority Vote, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 230 (BNA) (Feb. 7, 2005).
143. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 69 (urging the SEC “to allow the reforms that have been
adopted to have their effect”); ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 119; Letter to the SEC from David M.
Silk, Chairman, Task Force on Potential Changes to the Proxy Rules, Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York
(June 13, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s71003/tfpcprabny061303.htm (arguing for delay
in any new rules on board elections “until the scope and effect of initiatives already implanted are fully
understood”).
144. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 78.
145. See Stephen M Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal (UCLA Sch. of
Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121.
146. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 111 (charging that proxy fights would be “disruptive,
expensive and contrary to the best interests of publicly-owned companies and investors”); Bainbridge, supra
note 25, at 21 (estimating the total costs of the rule at $100 million per year); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note
61, at 83-85.
147. See Bainbridge, supra note 145, at 23; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 67 (predicting
“Balkanized, dysfunctional boards”); id. at 82-85.
148. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 120; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 86
(discussing why director recruiting has been more difficult in recent years).
149. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 86-87 (claiming that this is already happening because of
recent reforms).
150. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2
(reporting that a decision by the SEC that three companies can refuse requests by shareholders to nominate a
few candidates for board seats “was seen as an unambiguous sign that [proposed rule 14a-11] is dead”).
151. See Arthur Levitt, Let the Little Guy in the Boardroom, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004, at A23 (arguing
that “[t]he sky won’t fall” if investors are given the power to nominate directors).
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latter have no reason to elect directors who engage in self-dealing or act against their
interests. In any case, the rule would allow a shareholder to nominate only one or two
directors, who will be unable to pursue such activities even if they were elected. In one
form of the proposal the right to nominate directors would arise only after certain trigger
events that supposedly signal special corporate governance problems in the firm. 152
If investors did manage to get some nominees elected, they would have no reason to
fight rather than cooperate with management, except to the extent that management’s
performance is inferior. Directors who are independent and effective should be welcomed
by large investors rather than deterred from serving. The very existence of the rule could
change the attitudes of executives and directors, making them more attentive to
shareholder concerns so as to avoid a proxy challenge that would be embarrassing to
incumbents, even if it failed.
Nonetheless, the rule would impose some costs on corporations. Even if special
interest investors could not use the rule to elect directors, they could use it as a vehicle to
publicize their views at company expense. More important, the rule would probably
produce little benefit. 153 Again, the right to nominate candidates for the board may kick
in only after certain uncommon trigger events. Shareholders making nominations would
have to bear the expenses of proxy solicitations for their nominees if they lose and
perhaps even if they win. 154 They would also incur the wrath of managers, not only those
they challenge, but of the corporate establishment generally. 155 As a result, investors
would probably not bother to nominate board candidates except in rare cases of broad
dissatisfaction with incumbent management. The same defects in the proposal
undoubtedly account for its lukewarm support from institutional investors.
If rule 14a-11 is adopted and fails to generate much improvement, its failure “could
justify consideration of more expansive reforms of corporate elections.” 156 It is more
likely, though, that the rule’s failure would deflate demands for further reform. The
corporate establishment is now using SOX and other recent reforms to oppose further
reforms like 14a-11. It will undoubtedly use the same tactic if 14a-11 is instituted and has
little effect. The failure of 14a-11 would also dampen the enthusiasm of investors and
bolster the opposition of managers to further changes in the same direction.
The current impetus for corporate governance reform stems largely from the
devastation wreaked by recent corporate catastrophes. As memories of those disasters
fade, the inertia that generally prevents corporate governance reform will settle in again.

152. Security Holder Direct Nominations, Exchange Act Rel. No. 48,626, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (proposed
Oct. 23, 2003).
153. See Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 50 n.17. Significantly, the ABA Task Force agrees: “The history of
proxy contests shows how difficult it is to elect directors in opposition to management’s nominees . . . . New
mechanisms will not likely result in significant numbers of shareholder-nominated directors being elected.”
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 61, at 119-20.
154. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 484 (“Insurgents have no right to reimbursement out of corporate
funds. Rather, an insurgent will be reimbursed only if an appropriate resolution is approved by a majority of
both the board of directors and the shareholders.”). These expenses are substantial. See Bebchuk, supra note
110, at 14-17.
155. See Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 50 (stating that shareholders will fear “litigation or company
retaliation”).
156. Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 51.
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We now have a window of opportunity for change (unless it has already closed). 157 If we
choose ineffective reforms, we will blow this opportunity, and may not get another until
the next economic debacle.
C. Enhanced Fiduciary Duties and Legal Liability
Thirty-seven years ago Professor Bishop said, “[t]he search for cases in which
directors of industrial corporations have been held liable... for negligence uncomplicated
by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack.
There is little evidence of liability even for Merovingian supineness.” 158
There are occasional proclamations that the law is changing and that henceforth
directors will incur liability if they are less than highly diligent and prudent. This
happened after the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom 159
holding directors of TransUnion liable for approving a takeover bid. The proclamation
proved wrong—the Delaware legislature enacted a law permitting corporations
essentially to eliminate the duty of care 160 and, more important, the Delaware Supreme
Court showed itself no more eager to impose liability for lack of care after Van Gorkom
than it had been before. Personal liability of directors remains almost unheard of. 161
Now there are new claims of the emergence of a stringent duty of care based on the
agreement of ten former directors of Enron to pay $13 million from their own pockets as
part of a settlement of a class action against the board. This, too, seems to be a false
alarm. The amount is small and, given the egregious facts of the Enron collapse, the case
seems unlikely to have much precedential value. 162
Occasionally a commentator calls for courts to impose tougher fiduciary duties, 163
and perhaps this would be a good idea. Delaware now holds directors liable for bad
decisions only if an act is so unreasonable that it can be ascribed only to bad faith. 164
When interested transactions are approved by a majority of the disinterested directors,
plaintiffs challenging the transaction have the difficult burden of proving that it was
unfair to the corporation. 165 Corporations might benefit if directors were required to be
more diligent, reasonable, and skeptical.
Under current conditions, however, tougher fiduciary standards would bring few
benefits. Greater fear of liability might make boards more cautious than investors would
like. Most directors own little of the company’s stock and therefore gain little if risky
projects succeed. Fear of being sued over risky ventures could dissuade boards from such
157. See Bratton, supra note 50, at 25 (“The post Enron political climate has faded and management
influence again registers.”).
158. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099-1101 (1968).
159. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).
161. See Bernard S. Black, et al., Liability Risk for Outside Directors, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 153 (2005)
(giving data).
162. See Lucian Bebchuk, What’s $13 Million Among Friends?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A17.
163. See Lisa Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through
Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393 (2005).
164. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255-56 (Del. 2000) (holding that directors breach the duty of care
only if an act is so unreasonable as to be essentially inexplicable by anything other than bad faith).
165. See CLARK, supra note 115, at 147-48.
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projects even if they could reasonably expect to be exonerated. Directors are insured
against liability except for bad faith, so the main effect of higher fiduciary duties might
be higher insurance premiums. 166 If personal liability, even for gross negligence,
nonetheless became a real possibility, many potential directors might refuse to serve—
especially those with substantial personal wealth.
In any case, the states are unlikely to adopt stricter fiduciary duties. Van Gorkom
triggered a storm of controversy and new legislation that essentially allowed Delaware
companies to exempt themselves from its rule. 167 The Delaware courts now seem to have
tacitly abandoned Van Gorkom and have incurred no criticism for doing so. They have no
incentive to ramp up fiduciary duties.
D. Other Proposals
Many other proposals to improve corporate governance are being advanced, and
some are meritorious. Lucian Bebchuk and Marcel Kahan urge more liberal
reimbursement of proxy expenses for insurgents who attain defined levels of support. 168
This may be a good idea, but it still leaves incumbents in control of the corporate proxy
machinery; they can be dislodged only by a difficult and debilitating proxy fight. Paul
MacAvoy and Ira Millstein, inter alia, would not allow the CEO also to be board
chairman. 169 This is also a good idea but, like other measures to enhance board
disinterestedness, does nothing to insure that the board will be vigorous and wise. 170
Most public companies already have separate CEO and board chairman; their
performance has not been shown to be superior.
Removing barriers to unsolicited takeover bids would be beneficial. It would allow
shareholders to receive the substantial takeover premiums that now are often blocked. It
would also prod managers to improve the firm’s performance so as keep its share price
high enough to ward off raiders. However, unsolicited takeovers are not a panacea, either.
To attract most raiders, a target’s stock price must be far below potential value. 171
Contrary to some economic theory, there is little evidence that takeover targets are
underperformers. 172
Increased exposure to hostile bids may also create problems. It “may make it more
difficult for corporate managers to foster long-term cooperation and commitment to the
corporate enterprise by >team members’ other than shareholders.” 173 It may increase the
166. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 299 (“After Smith v. Van Gorkom, director and liability insurance
became very hard to get.”).
167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
168. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy
Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1135 (1990). See also Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 65-66 (proposing procedures
that would make it easier for shareholders to remove the entire board).
169. MACAVOY & MILLSTEIN, supra note 12, at 4-5, 100.
170. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of measures to increase board
independence).
171. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 934-36 (2002) (giving data on takeover premiums).
172. See Anum Agrawal & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Do Takeover Targets Underperform? Evidence from Operating
and Stock Returns, 38 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 721 (2003).
173. Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 1, 36 (2004).
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cost of corporate debt. 174 Many raiders overbid, 175 and some stocks may be undervalued
by the market, 176 so even ably performing managers could be ousted by hostile bidders.
Thus, removing antitakeover devices might induce managers not to improve corporate
performance but to ward off raiders in ways even more damaging to shareholders. They
might, for example, make unprofitable acquisitions, thereby dissipating free cash and the
firm’s borrowing capacity, both of which attract raiders. 177 In sum, the net benefits of
eliminating antitakeover devices would be small. Further, like other reform proposals,
this one is unlikely to be adopted.
Jeffrey Gordon proposes expanded disclosure about executive compensation. 178
This too would have some benefits and might even be cost-effective, but its effect would
be minor. First, this disclosure would motivate boards and CEOs to shift to prerequisites
that do not require disclosure. Executives of public companies have (or used to have)
lower compensation but more lavish prerequisites than comparable officers of private
companies. 179 The reason presumably is the desire in public companies to hide part of
the executives’ benefits by putting it in the form of prerequisites that need not be
disclosed. Executives presumably value direct more than indirect compensation; that is,
they prefer the firm to give them an extra dollar of salary rather than spend it on a firm
hunting lodge. Accordingly, expanded disclosure may merely cause a shift to less
efficient forms of compensation.
Calls for more disclosure also assume that it will lead to effective action, but this is
dubious. Even if shareholders’ approval were required for a compensation package, the
usual collective action problems deter them from investigating each firm’s package and
waging a proxy fight if a package is unreasonable. For example, Enron’s compensation
package encouraged the officers’ “obsession with short-term numbers.” 180 How likely is
it that even with enhanced disclosure, some Enron shareholders would have detected this
problem and waged a successful fight to rectify it? Gordon posits that directors’ concern
for their reputations will prod them to insist on efficient compensation, 181 but hopes
based on outside directors have always been dashed before, 182 and there is no reason to
think that this case would be any different.
The most promising current proposal is that election of directors require a majority
(rather than a plurality) shareholder vote. 183 This rule would enable shareholders to
174. See Mark S. Klock et al., Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 693 (2005) (stating that antitakeover provisions lower the cost of debt financing).
175. In many, if not most, takeovers the acquirer’s stock price falls. See supra note 43.
176. In an efficient market, no stock should be undervalued. And, if a stock somehow were undervalued, a
raider’s bid for it should alert the market, which would then correct the valuation. However, it is hard for
managers to transmit complex proprietary information to the market. See supra note 126. The problem is
exacerbated by the managers’ lack of credibility in the securities markets, especially in light of the frequency of
false and misleading disclosures in recent years. Thus, markets may not always be efficient.
177. In one notable example, Paramount made a bid for Time conditioned on Time’s abandonment of its
proposed acquisition of Warner. Time and Warner persisted, and Paramount dropped its bid. See generally
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
178. Gordon, supra note 27.
179. See MCEACHERN, supra note 36, at 65-66, 80, 87.
180. Bratton, supra note 50, at 1328.
181. Gordon, supra note 27, at 123-24.
182. See supra Part III.C.
183. See Louis Lavelle, A Simple Way to Make Boards Behave, BUS. WK., Jan. 31, 2005, at 38 (reporting
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remove unsatisfactory directors without having to present a rival candidate. The threat of
embarrassment would pressure boards to pay more heed to investors. Nonetheless, the
proposal stops far short of a remedy for separation of ownership and control. First, the
proposal is being advanced in nonbinding shareholder resolutions. It is always difficult to
get shareholder approval of resolutions opposed by management. 184 Even if resolutions
are adopted, the boards most in need of reform are the ones most likely to ignore the
resolution; already, “many boards routinely ignore shareholder resolutions even when
they win.” 185 Further, even with majority voting the disapproval of a candidate would
leave the candidate on the board until a successor is chosen or create a vacancy, which in
most states would be filled by the other directors. 186
Even if majority election was imposed by law, its effects would still depend largely
on the incumbents’ fear of embarrassment. Again, the worst boards are most likely to be
impervious to shareholder rejection of some directors. Unless the entire board is rejected,
the remnant could still govern as it pleases. A majority vote requirement would probably
weed out only the worst directors; their replacements may be no better than mediocre. 187
The requirement could also cause problems. Some major shareholders would still
have to campaign against a board candidate. In so doing, they would incur financial costs,
management retribution, and possibly legal difficulties. 188 Companies with low
shareholder turnout could have board candidates rejected despite small opposition. For
instance, if only 51% of the shares were voted, a mere 2% negative vote would doom a
candidate. 189 In such cases, a minority of shareholders with a separate agenda (such as a
union, a competitor, or a political faction) could torpedo a director it opposes with only a
few votes. The prospect of an unpleasant campaign could deter good candidates from
running.

that this proposal has been submitted as a shareholder resolution at as many as 100 companies); Patrick
McGeehan, It’s Voting Time Again, But No Isn’t an Option, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, § 3, at 4. The American
Bar Association Business Law Section’s Committee on Corporate Laws is considering changing the Model
Business Corporation Act to require a majority vote to elect directors. ABA Panel Weighing Possible Changes
To Model Act on Voting for Directors, 8 Corp. Governance Rep. (BNA) 39 (Apr. 4, 2005).
184. At Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. a majority vote resolution in 2004 was supported by only 7.4% of the
votes cast. Lavelle, supra note 183.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(b) (2005) (“Each director shall hold office until such director’s
successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or removal.”); id. § 142(e) (“Any
vacancy occurring in any office of the corporation . . . shall be filled as the bylaws provide. In the absence of
such provision, the vacancy shall be filled by the board of directors or other governing body.”). A majority vote
requirement could also create unintended results in corporations with low voter turnout. If only 51% of the
shares were voted and 49% were voted in favor of a board candidate, that candidate would not be elected even
though the decision of holders of a mere 2% of the shares to vote against the candidate or to withhold their
votes from her would hardly signal strong shareholder disapproval.
187. See Lavelle, supra note 183 (“In reality, only directors deemed to have been particularly bad stewards
would likely be ousted.”).
188. For example, shareholders who cooperated in such an effort could trigger poison pills or Williams Act
obligations. See generally Black, supra note 101, at 550-51, 556-59.
189. If, on the other hand, only a majority of the votes cast were required, shareholders would be forced to
openly vote against a candidate, rather than just abstaining from voting. That necessity would increase their
exposure to pressures from management. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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V. REUNITING OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

A. Nomination of Directors by Major Shareholders
Most serious legal problems do not admit of an easy solution. Fortunately, the
problem of corporate governance does: The official slate of nominees for the board of
directors on the corporation’s proxy statement should be chosen by a committee (the
“Shareholders’ Committee”) comprising the corporation’s ten to twenty largest
shareholders. This committee would only nominate candidates for the board; other
shareholders (perhaps in cooperation with management) could run competing slates.
However, given the uniformity of shareholders’ interests in maximizing share value, 190
such contests should be extremely rare.
Creation of the Shareholders’ Committee will overcome the collective action
problem that now denies shareholders, the owners of the corporation, true participation in
control. Individual shareholders will not have to bear the costs of proxy solicitations. The
Committee’s nominees will appear on the company’s proxy statement and the solicitation
costs will be borne by the company. Even if the costs of serving on the Committee are
borne by the members themselves, these costs should be small. If these costs nonetheless
prove problematic, rules could provide for their reimbursement.
This approach will result in nomination of better qualified directors. CEOs want
passive boards. Despite increasingly stringent definitions of independence, many
directors still have “soft” conflicts of interest that make them beholden to the CEO. 191 In
order to maximize the value of their stock in the company, the largest shareholders would
have a strong motive to find and nominate the most independent and able people and give
them the right incentives. Currently, cooperative directors are rewarded with renomination, friendship, and often with side payments, 192 all of which can be withheld
from obstreperous directors. Directors who go along with the CEO acquire reputations as
desirable directors and can hope for further directorships, while directors who rock the
boat are rarely named to other boards. If directors were nominated by the largest
shareholders, they would be rewarded for maximizing share value, and would act
accordingly.
The Shareholders Committee is not merely a solution to the corporate governance
problem. It, or something quite similar, is probably the only solution. Since the
fundamental problem of corporate governance is the separation of ownership and control,
any solution must make governance responsive to the shareholders. That is, corporations
must be managed so as to maximize shareholder wealth. This can be done only by vesting
control in the shareholders. Since the total body of shareholders is too numerous to act
together, there must be an effective way of selecting a representative group (i.e., a board
of directors) responsive to the shareholders. Since collective action problems and rational

190. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
192. Even when an outside director has no affiliation with the CEO, he always has some interest that the
CEO can serve. For example, the CEO can reward a cooperative director with a corporate contribution to the
director’s favorite charity. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. In effect, if the director has no prior
connection with the company, one can be created.
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apathy also prevent most shareholders from making informed votes on a regular basis, the
nomination process must serve as the effective choice point. Shareholder voting must
serve only to rubber stamp the nomination process, except in rare circumstances.
Likewise, most shareholders cannot take part in the nomination process, which therefore
must be delegated to a group that is both competent and dedicated to maximizing share
value. That group must be the corporation’s large institutional shareholders.
B. Possible Objections
1. The Unity of Shareholder Interests
A common objection to shareholder primacy is that investors have various
preferences; there is no united investor goal that boards could pursue even if they wanted
to do so. 193 The critique has two facets. First, some object that the supposed investor goal
of maximizing share value is amorphous because it fails to distinguish between shortterm and long-term maximization and between the effects of accurate, as opposed to false
and misleading, disclosure. Shareholders can profit from false disclosures only if they
thereby pump up the stock price and then dump their own stock at the inflated price
before the market wises up.
In weighing the charge that institutional investors are obsessed with the short term
(and all other objections), one must beware the Nirvana fallacy—that is, the fallacy that if
an approach might create a problem, however remote the possibility and however trivial
the problem, that approach must be rejected. Rather, as Winston Churchill recognized
with respect to democracy, the question must be how a given system compares with the
options. 194 Assume, for instance, that some mutual funds might stress a portfolio
company’s short-term performance so as to boost its stock price briefly and thereby
improve the fund’s short-term performance. However, it is unlikely that a majority of
nominating committee members would favor such a policy. 195 Further, such members
could not easily induce directors and managers to act on that preference. If needed,
however, rules could deter such behavior. For example, private contacts between
directors and nominating committee members and transactions between the corporation
and committee members might be barred.
Further, giving large shareholders a major role in corporate governance would

193. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Pension Funds Play Politics, TECH CENT. STATION, Apr. 21, 2004,
http://www.techcentralstation.com/042104g.html (stating that “the interests of large and small shareholders
often differ”); K.A.D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219 (2005) (noting that
interests of different types of institutional shareholders may differ, and that some often do not seek
maximization of share value); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 78 (some shareholders, like labor unions
and shareholders promoting social causes, pursue special interests); Rosenbaum, supra note 108, at 177-78
(public pension funds have their own agendas). Concerning charges of short-termism, see supra notes 118-123
and accompanying text.
194. “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Winston
Churchill (Nov. 11, 1947) (quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 202 (4th ed. 1992)).
195. A fund might favor this tactic if it were trying to avoid an extremely bad quarter, which could prompt
many investors to abandon the fund. It is unlikely, though, that many funds would have the same problem at the
same time.
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improve their attitudes by shifting their incentives. True, institutions attending
informational sessions with corporate executives typically focus their questions on the
next quarter’s earnings. The reason for this, though, is not that this is the only topic of
interest to them, but that this is the only topic that executives consider appropriate and
deserving of a straight answer. Serious questions about a company’s long-term strategy
would be treated as hostile and brushed off with a reiteration of statements from the
company’s annual report.
With a significant voice in control, large shareholders would be able to focus on
long-term strategy and have strong reasons to do so. Like all shareholders, they will want
to optimize the performance of companies in which they invest. Further, many
institutional investors compete for funds. Currently these institutions make some effort to
compete on the basis of ability to pick winners, but savvy investors know that their
claims are largely empty: the relative performance of mutual funds tends to rise and fall
in a random walk. 196
If these institutions participated in control of portfolio companies, they would
compete by trying to improve the performance of those companies. Not only their own
investors but other shareholders of the portfolio company would ask what criteria they
use in nominating and evaluating corporate directors. It is hard to imagine the institutions
would claim any pole star other than maximization of share value. Could they make such
statements but then secretly instruct directors to stress the short term? Such a ploy would
be hard to carry out and would run a risk of suits for fraud. Moreover, directors
concerned about their reputations and prospects for directorships with that and other
companies would have a strong motive to ignore such instructions. In short, under a
system of shareholder committees several vectors would push corporate governance away
from emphasis on the short term and toward emphasis on maximizing share value.
Nonetheless, if fear of short-termism were a fatal objection to this plan, membership on
the shareholder committee could be limited to investors who have held their stock in the
company for a specified minimum period. In any case, under the current managerdominated corporate governance system, deviation from the goal of maximizing share
value is far greater than it would be under a system with shareholder domination.
Managers are often more interested in empire-building than in maximizing share value
and, because their investments are not diversified, they have greater opportunities and
motives than would institutional investors to engage in pump-and-dump schemes. 197
Managers with high-powered incentive compensation may also take excessive risks. 198
Critics of shareholder primacy also charge that maximizing share price is not the
primary goal of all investors. Some, like employees and suppliers, may prefer growth and
caution. 199 Others, like public pension funds, may have political goals, like maximizing

196. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 24 (2003) (stating that future steps
or directions cannot be predicted based on past actions).
197. See supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
198. See David J. Denis et al., Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation? 2 (Mar. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=695583 (noting that “the convexity of options
gives managers the incentive to take excessive risk”).
199. Since employees cannot diversify their investments of human and financial capital, they are riskaverse, while non-employee shareholders are risk-neutral. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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the company’s employment in the fund’s home state. 200 However, such shareholders are
a small minority; the vast majority favor maximizing share value. 201 Moreover, society
benefits from the efficiency that results from pursuing this goal. 202
2. Opportunism
Another possible objection to nomination of directors by major shareholders is that
those shareholders might use their power to benefit themselves through insider trading or
interested transactions with the company. Some contend that some institutional investors
already gain privileged access to inside information and trade on it. 203
These concerns cannot be categorically dismissed, but they are minor, far smaller
than related problems under current practices, and can be further reduced by some simple
steps. Interested transactions between a corporation and its directors are already a
problem. 204 By contrast, public investors do not now fear large shareholders but welcome
them. A company’s stock price generally rises when a large investor buys a big block of
its stock. 205 Public investors clearly do not expect the large shareholder to exploit them
but protect their (mutual) interests.
Members of a shareholder committee would have incentives to curb insider trading
and interested transactions by managers and directors. They would have few
200. See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA 53 (1991) (stating that public pension fund trustees
are mostly political appointees with their own “political agendas”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1335 (1991); Rosenbaum,
supra note 108, at 177; Camara, supra note 193, at 27 (stating that the interests of different types of institutional
investors sometimes differ and that some do not seek maximization of share value).
201. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 43, at 469-70 n.15 (“Although investors have somewhat different
preferences on issues such as dividends and the like, they are generally united by a desire to maximize share
value.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 883-84
(2005) (arguing that shareholders generally favor maximizing long-term share value); Rock, supra note 95, at
466 (stating that “the potential for conflict between large and small shareholders will likely be minimal”);
Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for Proxy Access, in
SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuck ed., 2004) (showing that among eight
firms writing letters to oppose Rule 14a-11, the largest union or state pension fund held less than .75% of the
company’s shares). As evidence, note that the “only [shareholder] resolutions that systematically obtain
majority support are ones calling for changes that are viewed as value enhancing by a wide range of financial
institutions.” Bebchuk, supra note 110, at 32.
202. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
203. See Bin Ke & Kathy Petroni, How Informed Are Actively Trading Institutional Investors? Evidence
from Their Trading Behavior Before a Break in a String of Consecutive Earnings Increases (Jan. 14, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=448720 (alleging that some institutional
investors already profit from trading on inside information).
204. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also Stewart, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
205. See Michael Barclay & Clifford Holderness, The Law and Large Block Trades, 35 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1992) (presenting a study showing that minority shareholders generally gain substantially when a large block
of a company’s stock is sold at a premium); Clifford Holderness & Dennis Sheehan, The Role of Majority
Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 317 (1988); Andrei
Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 465-71 (1986)
(stating that the presence of large non-management shareholders benefits small shareholders). In a dramatic
recent example, shares of General Motors surged 18% when Kirk Kerkorian made an offer to acquire 9% of the
stock. Danny Hakim, Kerkorian Seeking 9% Stake in G.M., N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at C1. Large institutional
shareholdings are also associated with more favorable share price reactions to the selection of a new CEO. See
Mark R. Huson et al., Managerial Succession and Firm Performance, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (2004).
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opportunities to extract private benefits, and would not welcome such conduct by other
committee members, so committees will have incentives to monitor themselves. 206
Directors will not want to risk liability or disrepute by approving company transactions
with committee members or by feeding insider information to them. The law already
prohibits trading on inside information and polices interested transactions under a “strict
scrutiny” standard, 207 and would continue to do so. Again, rules restricting contacts
between committee members and directors might reduce any potential problems here.
3. Exploitation of Non-Shareholder Constituencies
The team-production model holds that shareholder control would be undesirable
because it would disadvantage non-shareholder constituencies. This charge is
contradicted by both theory and evidence. 208
4. Locking In Capital
Some adherents of the team-production model posit that shareholder rights are weak
as part of the design of corporate law to lock in capital. 209 The claim is feeble. 210 Ease of
dissolution can pose a problem in business organizations, but the problem it poses is
exploitation by a wealthier owner in a closely held firm by forcing an auction of the
firm’s assets when the other owners lack funds to bid the true value of the assets, so that
the wealthier owner gets to grab the assets at a bargain price. 211 Clearly this is not a
concern with public companies.
It is hard to see what other problem there could be that makes it advisable to lock in
the shareholders as a body. Shareholders certainly have no incentive to break up the
company through dissolution unless the firm would be more valuable that way than as a
going concern. If the shareholders as a body want to cash in their investment, the logical
step is to sell the firm as a going concern. That is what actually happens in an acquisition.
In that case, stakeholders and society as a whole suffer no loss of the (wealth-increasing)
productive capacity of the firm.
Some aspects of the corporate form are necessary to protect creditors, but this has
nothing to do with the separation of ownership and control. Creditors suffer if dividend
payments leave a corporation with insufficient assets to pay its debts. Corporate law
handles this concern by forbidding such dividends, 212 not by trusting in a board free of
shareholder control. Indeed, when it serves the interests of managers, boards can slight
206. See Black, supra note 78, at 887 (“If a half-dozen institutions must act jointly to exercise effective
voice, the institutions can watch each other at the same time that they’re watching corporate managers.”).
207. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATIONS 581 (5th ed. 2006).
208. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
209. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253; Margaret M. Blair,
Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51
UCLA L. REV. 387, 391 (2003); Blair, supra note 173, at 3.
210. It also contradicts some other claims of the team productions theorists. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 45 (Cal. 1961) (holding that a partner’s dissolution by express
will violates his fiduciary duties if he is trying to force an auction of the firm’s assets in order to “appropriate to
his own use the new prosperity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his copartner”).
212. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2005).
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the interests of creditors. 213
There is one constituency that does profit from locking in the shareholders—the
managers. The difficulty shareholders face in selling the firm’s entire equity allows
managers to favor their own interests over the shareholders’ with little fear of being
ousted by a takeover. There is abundant evidence that managers in fact seize this
opportunity. In sum, the inability of shareholders is not part of the solution but part of the
problem.
C. Implementation
1. The Prospects for Institutional Shareholder Activism
The joke is often told of the economist walking with a student who says, “Professor,
that looks like a $20 bill on the street. Shall I pick it up?” The economist replies, “Of
course not. If it really were a $20 bill, someone else would already have picked it up.” If
the Shareholders’ Committee is such a great idea, why hasn’t someone already picked it
up? The answer lies in the collective action problems and legal obstacles that investors
face. In pluralistic and representative democracies a minority often prevails over a
majority even if the policy favored by the minority is in sum less beneficial to society
than some other policy. If the minority individuals’ interests in the issue are greater than
the majority individuals’ interests, the latter have less incentive than the minority to
contest the issue.
Although the costs of managerial domination to investors exceed the benefits to
corporate executives, even the largest institutional investors lack the incentive to fight for
change; the costs to an institution to fight for change would be immense, but the
institution would realize only its pro rata share of the benefits. In contrast, corporate
executives have an intense interest in preserving the status quo and access to corporate
treasuries to ward off threats to their hegemony.
However, the costs of collective action by investors are falling and should continue
to fall. Organizations like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the leading proxy
advisory service, are becoming more effective at coordinating investor activity. 214 As
institutional portfolios grow, the largely fixed costs of activism decline on a percentage
basis.
In recent years institutions have increased their participation in corporate
governance, and their experience makes it likely that this trend will continue. It was once
rare for institutions to undertake proxy fights over antitakeover devices. They now do so
regularly, and often win. 215 Recent corporate scandals, the flaws of Sarbanes-Oxley as a
cure for corporate governance problems, and the apparent defeat of rule 14a-11 should all

213. See generally GILSON & BLACK, supra note 43, at 627 (citing Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder
Losses in Leveraged Buyouts, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 959 (1993)) (showing substantial market losses in bonds of
companies in leveraged buyouts); Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205
(1988) (stating that a firm’s bond rating is routinely downgraded after a highly leveraged takeover).
214. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the Business Roundtable,
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 564 (2005) (stating that many institutional shareholders follow ISS or some other
advisory service).
215. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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awaken institutions to the pressing need for new reforms. More institutions are now
backing resolutions to require a majority shareholder vote for election of directors. 216 As
these resolutions involve election of directors, they intrude further into corporate
governance than resolutions against antitakeover devices.
A child must learn to crawl before it can walk, and to walk before it can run. In the
corporate governance race, institutional investors learned to crawl and are now mastering
walking. Learning to run may be next.
2. The Prospects for Legislation
In the wake of the evident defeat of rule 14a-11 by the corporate establishment,
legislation to institute shareholder nominating committees does not seem politically
feasible; investors are still too scattered and disorganized to achieve any substantial
reform. The forces that have prevented a “race to the top” in state corporate laws 217 make
it unlikely that any state legislature will embrace shareholder nominating committees in
an effort to swipe corporate franchise business from Delaware.
There is, however, some reason for hope. The growing assertiveness and
coordination of institutional investors may alter the political balance of forces. In
particular, the SEC might become amenable to a quasi-substantive disclosure
requirement. When the Commission desires a substantive change but lacks authority to
impose it, it has at times adopted a disclosure rule that has the practical effect of requiring
public companies to make the change the SEC wants.
Thus when it wanted to stop unfair going private transactions but could not do so
directly, the SEC adopted a rule requiring a company going private to state whether it
believes that the terms of the deal are fair to public shareholders. 218 As a practical as well
as a legal matter, the company must say that it does so believe. Shareholders who
consider the term unfair can then sue under the federal securities laws by claiming that
the company’s statement is false. More recently Congress used the same ploy in
Sarbanes-Oxley by requiring each company to have a financial expert on its audit
committee or explain why it does not. 219 In practice, of course, the company cannot say
that its audit committee has no financial expert.
The SEC could instead require each company to state whether it has a shareholdercontrolled or a self-perpetuating nomination process for its board of directors. At least at
first, some companies might defiantly cling to the latter, but experience with the
shareholder-controlled process should soon overcome such resistance.
3. The Possibility of Private Reform
Investors could demand that corporations institute shareholder nominating
committees on their own. Nothing in corporate law prohibits such a move. Such efforts
216. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
218. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014 (1999) (requiring a company to “[s]tate whether the subject company . . .
reasonably believes that the [going private] transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders”).
219. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h)(1)(iii)
(2005) (requiring that the registrant “must explain why it does not have an audit committee financial expert” if
that is the case).
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now seem unlikely, but this situation may change. Again, institutional investors have
gradually become more assertive in corporate governance. Some investors already
appreciate the importance of shareholder rights to share value, 220 and that appreciation is
likely to grow.
Managers would furiously resist such efforts because they would end management
domination, something no other reform has done or threatens to do. CEOs could exact
reprisals against rebellious institutional investors. Further, most managers have links with
other business executives through interlocking memberships on boards, charitable
foundations and industry organizations. 221 Managers facing demands for real shareholder
democracy could expect fellow members of the business aristocracy to join in punishing
insurgents, a daunting prospect for investors.
The most likely candidates for shareholder uprisings are poorly performing
companies, especially those where managers have committed serious wrongs. Already
some institutional investors are now willing to step forward and seek corporate
governance changes in such firms. 222 Experiments may begin with something less than
complete cession of board nominations to a shareholder committee. Such a committee
might be authorized to nominate a minority or half of the board, or a couple of the largest
shareholders could be added to existing nominating committees comprised solely of
directors. 223 Experience with such half-measures could lead to experiments with full
shareholder control.
4. Impetus for Reform: The Globalization of Financial Markets
Two possible triggers of corporate governance reform would be a recession or
another series of corporate scandals accompanied by a plunging stock market. Neither of
these is to be desired. There is another possibility, however: globalization of financial
markets. Until recently, America faced limited competition for investment capital. Legal
and practical obstacles restricted capital flows across national boundaries. More
important, only a few industrialized countries were a viable alternative location for
investment, and even these countries had legal systems and traditions less solicitous of
investors than America’s. America could be complacent about treatment of investors
without fear of hemorrhaging capital.
Those days are over. Other countries are reforming their corporate governance
systems to be more responsive to shareholders. 224 Nations like China and India that not
long ago held no attraction for investors now compete vigorously for capital. The stakes
in this competition are steep. For years the United States has been able to run huge trade
deficits because foreigners have been willing to invest their trade surplus here. If America
220. Thus some analysts weigh shareholder rights when valuing stocks. See supra note 96.
221. See Larcker et al., supra note 56 (documenting the correlation between such links and executive
compensation).
222. See supra note 107.
223. Some states permit exercise of the usual powers of the board by other persons if so provided in the
certificate of incorporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
224. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 128, at 440; The Bell Tolls for Germany Inc., BUS. WK., Aug.
15, 2005, at 40, 40-41 (“Germany’s banks . . . are under severe pressure from foreign shareholders to boost
returns to the lofty levels of U.S. and British rivals . . . . As a result, German managers now receive almost daily
reminders of the power of international capital.”).
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ceases to be the premiere locus of investment and becomes just one of many competitors
for capital, we could suffer serious capital outflows.
That discharge would have grave repercussions for many constituencies. The
American standard of living is determined by its productivity and treatment of investment
capital is a crucial element of productivity. Previously, it has not been thought of that
way; from now on, it must be. Even a country with efficient workers cannot prosper if,
for example, the fruits of their labor are looted by a corrupt government because investors
will not fund businesses unless they expect attractive profits. Likewise, if our corporate
governance system condones waste and inefficiency, investment here will flag, American
workers will have to accept lower compensation, and the entire economy will falter.
If this threat is recognized, the political vectors impinging on corporate governance
will change. American financial institutions have particular reasons for concern. Investors
send funds to institutions in countries where they want to invest. If America becomes less
appealing to investors, our financial institutions will suffer. They should take the lead in
demanding better corporate governance. Their efforts should include publicizing the
importance of the issue to other constituencies, which should lend their support once they
grasp the threat.
D. Peripheral Benefits
Many subsidiary issues about the composition and role of the ideal board have been
debated for decades: How large should it be? How many insiders (if any) should it have?
Are professional directors desirable? How often should the board meet? How far should
it intrude into strategic planning? Should it have its own staff? How should directors be
compensated?
Empirical answers to these questions have been impossible because of board
domination by CEOs. For example, studies have found no correlation between a
corporation’s performance and the percentage of outsiders on its board, 225 but this fact
may merely reflect that CEOs now dominate the selection and conduct of both outside
directors and subordinate inside directors. If directors were truly chosen by shareholders,
their incentives would be different. This does not necessarily mean that boards would
eschew insiders. It may be that subordinate officers, freed from the fetters of
groupthink 226 and at least from overt domination by the CEO, would prove a fertile
source of knowledge and ideas for outside directors.
Real shareholder control would foster a natural laboratory in which various
approaches would be tested to see what works best. Competition could be spirited.
Members of each firm’s Shareholder Committee will seek to optimize the firm’s
performance in order to optimize the members’ performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite repeated waves of reform for 75 years, corporate governance still suffers the
same basic problem identified by Berle and Means in the 1930s—the separation of
ownership and control. The corporate scandals and stock market retreat of 2000-2001
225. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.

[DENT] FINAL

76

5/10/2006 4:02:20 PM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Fall

triggered a new spate of changes, but these too seem destined to fail. Moreover, as
outrage over business fraud fades and the stock market stabilizes, political pressure for
further reform has subsided, so that even the modest change in the SEC’s proposed rule
14a-11 has been aborted. The time does not seem propitious for a serious effort to end
managerial hegemony.
Nonetheless, latent forces could soon revive the impetus for change. The recovery of
stock indices is weak; they remain far below their highs of 2000. Institutional investors
are gradually learning to be more assertive. If America’s trade deficit continues to deepen
and the value of the dollar continues to fall, more attention will focus on corporate
governance as a crucial factor in attracting investment capital. At that point there will be
renewed concern to end the separation of ownership and control.
This Article has offered a means of solving that problem. Transferring the
nomination of directors from a self-perpetuating board to a Shareholders Committee
comprised of a company’s largest shareholders will align governance structures with the
goal of investors to maximize efficiency and with it, share value. The only losers from
this revolution would be CEOs who wish not to optimize corporate performance but to
rule over a personal fiefdom. The winners will not only be investors but the entire
economy, which is to say, all Americans.

